Policy Analysis

The Future of Youth Civic Engagement in the MENA Region: Lessons from Jordan's Model

By the Editors of Next Future Institute

March 2026

Executive Summary

The Middle East and North Africa is home to one of the world's youngest populations, with approximately 140 million people under the age of 30. Yet civic engagement levels among Arab youth remain the lowest globally, with only nine percent participating in a civic organization in any given month. This paradox—a demographic dividend without civic infrastructure—represents both a governance risk and a generational opportunity. Jordan, where 63 percent of the population is under 30, has emerged as a compelling case study. Through constitutional reforms lowering the candidacy age to 25, a national youth strategy built on participatory methodology, and flagship civic education programs such as Ana Usharek, Jordan offers a replicable model—albeit an imperfect one. This paper examines the structural barriers to youth participation across MENA, evaluates Jordan's reform trajectory after the 2024 parliamentary elections, analyzes the role of digital activism, and proposes policy recommendations for U.S.–MENA partnerships that can translate demographic potential into democratic resilience.

I. The Youth Bulge: Demographic Dividend or Governance Liability?

The MENA region is experiencing a historic demographic transition. According to UNICEF's MENA Generation 2030 report, roughly 80 million youth aged 15–24 lived in the region as of 2015—a figure projected to reach 100 million by 2030 and 104 million by 2050. By mid-century, 271 million children, adolescents, and young people (ages 0–24) will inhabit the region. These numbers are not abstract. They represent an enormous cohort entering adulthood with expectations of employment, political voice, and social mobility that existing institutions have largely failed to provide.

The economic dimension of this challenge is severe. The International Labour Organization's 2024 regional brief found that the MENA region has the highest youth NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) rate of any global subregion at 33.2 percent—more than ten percentage points above the world average of 20.4 percent. Young women face disproportionate exclusion: female youth unemployment reached 38.5 percent in 2023, compared to 25.7 percent for young men. These figures represent not just economic failure but a fundamental barrier to civic participation. As Mercy Corps' landmark study on youth civic engagement in MENA concluded, young people's frustration "has stemmed largely from existing institutions and norms that have denied them economic and social opportunities and political voice."

The political implications are well-documented. Arab Barometer survey data consistently shows that youth across the region report lower trust in government, lower interest in formal politics, and a greater desire to emigrate than older generations. In Tunisia—the sole democratic success story of the 2011 Arab uprisings—only 31 percent of young adults now support liberal democracy, ten points below older cohorts. This is not apathy in the conventional sense. It is the rational withdrawal of a generation that watched the promise of the Arab Spring dissipate into authoritarian restoration, civil war, and economic stagnation.

The Civic Engagement Gap

The data on formal civic engagement is stark. UNICEF reports that civic engagement levels among MENA adolescents and youth are the lowest in the world, with only nine percent volunteering with a civic organization in any given month. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace documented that in the years following 2011, youth civic engagement declined across every measurable dimension: political party membership, electoral turnout, attendance of campaign rallies, protest participation, meeting attendance, and petition signing.

Yet these figures mask significant variation. Arab Barometer data shows that civic participation is highest among youth who take an active interest in politics, regularly follow the news, and use the internet—suggesting that the infrastructure for engagement matters as much as the will. Conversely, young women, the less educated, the unemployed, and rural youth are systematically underrepresented. The engagement gap is, in essence, a mirror of the region's broader inequality.

II. Jordan's Reform Trajectory: A Model Under Construction

Jordan presents a distinctive case in the MENA landscape. With 63 percent of its population under 30 and a youth unemployment rate that reached 46 percent for the 15–24 age group in late 2024—climbing to 66 percent for young women—the Hashemite Kingdom faces the full force of the region's demographic and economic pressures. Yet unlike many of its neighbors, Jordan has pursued a structured, if incremental, approach to expanding youth civic space.

Constitutional and Electoral Reforms

The Royal Committee to Modernize the Political System, established by King Abdullah II, produced a series of constitutional amendments and new electoral and political parties laws that directly addressed youth exclusion. The most consequential reform lowered the candidacy age from 30 to 25, removing a structural barrier that had effectively locked an entire generation out of formal representation. The new framework also mandated that each party list include at least one candidate under age 35 among its top five nominees—an institutional nudge designed to force parties to invest in younger leadership.

The September 2024 parliamentary elections were the first test of these reforms. The results were mixed. Voter turnout rose modestly to 32 percent—up from 29 percent in 2020—with 1.64 million of 5.1 million eligible voters casting ballots. Among voters under 35, turnout stood at 43.5 percent, a relatively encouraging figure given regional norms. However, only six candidates under 35 won seats, suggesting that while the formal barriers to entry have been reduced, informal ones—name recognition, tribal networks, financial resources—continue to constrain youth representation.

The National Youth Strategy (2019–2025)

Jordan's National Youth Strategy, developed through the Ministry of Youth in coordination with international partners, adopted a participatory methodology that itself embodied the civic engagement it sought to promote. The strategy's development involved face-to-face and online consultations with broad segments of Jordanian youth, an approach aligned with the Open Government Partnership commitment Jordan undertook to strengthen youth participation in policy development.

Critical to the strategy's design was its connection to Jordan's decentralization agenda. Research published in the Journal of Urban Planning and Development (2023) found that Jordan's centralized governmental hierarchy had left municipalities "without sufficient political, financial, or professional resources to administer planning processes from design to implementation." The strategy recognized that youth participation cannot be meaningful if it occurs only at the national level. Municipalities, the researchers argued, must "design programs that ensure effective communication with youth communities" to enable "sustainable and comprehensive urban policymaking plans that are more sensitive and responsive to youth ideas and opinions."

Ana Usharek: Civic Education at Scale

Perhaps the most replicable element of Jordan's model is the Ana Usharek ("I Participate") program, implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in partnership with Jordan's Ministry of Education. The program operates at two levels. In schools, the Ana Usharek-Schools initiative has introduced over 10,500 students in grades 5–10 across 350 schools to civic participation through an interactive, student-centered curriculum covering democratic principles, citizenship, human rights, tolerance, and critical thinking. At the university level, Ana Usharek engages youth aged 18–20 in public and private institutions through training sessions and weekly panel discussions designed to promote civic responsibility and democratic values.

The significance of Ana Usharek lies not only in its scale but in its institutional embeddedness. By partnering directly with the Ministry of Education to design curriculum, the program has moved beyond the typical NGO project cycle toward a more sustainable, state-integrated model—precisely the kind of approach that development practitioners have long advocated but rarely achieved.

III. Digital Activism: The Parallel Civic Space

While formal civic institutions in MENA have largely failed to absorb youth participation, digital platforms have created an alternative—if fragile—civic space. Research from the Institute for Policy and Society (2025) documents how social media platforms have become "essential tools for youth advocacy, enabling the rapid dissemination of information, collective action, and the mobilization of widespread support." The MENA region's experience with digital activism, from the coordination of the 2011 uprisings to contemporary movements around the wars in Gaza and Sudan, demonstrates the capacity of digital tools to "transcend borders, unite individuals around common causes, and pressure governments to enact meaningful change."

A 2023 study published in Social Sciences (MDPI) examined Jordanian youth specifically, finding that social media platforms play a significant role in political participation—particularly for those excluded from formal channels. Arab Barometer data reinforces this pattern: youth who use the internet regularly are significantly more likely to be civically engaged than their offline peers, suggesting that digital access functions as an enabler of broader participation.

The Limits and Risks of Digital Civic Space

Digital activism, however, is not a substitute for institutional reform. The Carnegie Endowment's 2023 analysis on rethinking youth activism in the MENA region introduced the concept of "apolitical activism"—coordinated humanitarian relief in Syria, volunteer beautification efforts in Lebanese cities, urbanization programs in Algerian slums—activities that operate outside traditional political arenas precisely because those arenas remain closed. While valuable, such activism often remains localized, episodic, and disconnected from policy processes.

Moreover, digital civic space in MENA exists under persistent threat. Youth-led digital movements must navigate surveillance, restrictive cybercrime laws, the spread of misinformation, and the digital divide that leaves rural and lower-income youth disconnected. UNICEF's 2020 rapid analysis on digital civic engagement warned that without deliberate efforts to bridge access gaps, digitalization risks amplifying rather than reducing inequalities in political voice.

IV. The Role of U.S.–MENA Partnerships

The United States has maintained a portfolio of youth-focused programs in MENA, anchored by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), housed within the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. MEPI's mission—to "empower partnerships between citizens, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and government institutions"—has produced several programs with demonstrated impact on youth civic capacity.

The Student Leaders Program brings students from across MENA for approximately five weeks of intensive leadership training in the United States annually. The Leaders for Democracy Fellowship provides early and mid-career professionals with training in participatory governance, conflict resolution, and political communication. The Tomorrow's Leaders program offers scholarships to underserved MENA students at accredited regional institutions. Collectively, MEPI's exchange programs bring over 100 MENA undergraduate students to U.S. academic institutions each year, where they "develop leadership skills and expand their understanding of civil society and the democratic process."

From Exchange Programs to Systemic Investment

These programs, while valuable, operate at a scale incommensurate with the challenge. Training 100 students per year in a region of 140 million youth under 30 is, at best, a proof of concept. The lessons from Jordan's model suggest that the most impactful interventions are those embedded in state institutions—like Ana Usharek's integration with the Ministry of Education—rather than those that extract individuals for external training and hope for diffusion effects upon return.

A more effective U.S.–MENA partnership framework would shift emphasis from individual leadership development to institutional capacity building: supporting ministries of education in developing civic curricula, assisting municipalities in building participatory planning mechanisms as part of decentralization agendas, and investing in digital infrastructure that enables rather than surveils civic participation.

The Brookings Institution's 2018 analysis of marginalized youth in Jordan made a pointed recommendation: international donors must "direct more resources to youth programs and policies that foster youth political inclusion, promote civic engagement, and support young people in their transition from school to work." The operative word is "foster"—not impose, not extract, but create conditions within existing institutions for youth agency to take root.

V. Policy Recommendations

Drawing on the evidence reviewed in this paper, we propose five policy recommendations for U.S. policymakers, MENA governments, and international development partners:

1. Institutionalize Civic Education in National Curricula

Jordan's Ana Usharek model demonstrates that civic education can be delivered at scale when integrated into ministry-led curriculum development. USAID and MEPI should prioritize technical assistance for education ministries across MENA to develop age-appropriate, locally adapted civic education programs. The goal is not the creation of parallel NGO curricula but the transformation of state educational systems to include democratic literacy as a core competency.

2. Lower Structural Barriers to Youth Candidacy

Jordan's reduction of the candidacy age from 30 to 25, combined with party list quotas for youth, represents a replicable reform. The U.S. should use diplomatic channels and democracy assistance programs to encourage similar reforms across the region. However, as Jordan's 2024 elections demonstrated, formal eligibility alone is insufficient. Campaign finance reform, public funding for first-time candidates, and mentorship programs linking youth candidates with experienced political actors are essential complements.

3. Invest in Municipal-Level Participatory Governance

Decentralization creates the closest point of contact between young citizens and government. Development partners should invest in participatory budgeting mechanisms, youth advisory councils at the municipal level, and capacity building for local governments to meaningfully engage their youngest constituents. Jordan's experience shows that without fiscal decentralization and administrative capacity building, municipal youth programs remain symbolic.

4. Protect and Expand Digital Civic Space

Digital platforms have become the primary civic arena for MENA youth, yet restrictive cybercrime laws and surveillance practices threaten this space. U.S. policy should condition security assistance on the protection of online civic space and support digital literacy programs that equip youth to navigate misinformation, protect their privacy, and use digital tools for constructive civic engagement rather than merely reactive protest.

5. Link Civic Engagement to Economic Opportunity

Mercy Corps' research demonstrates that civic engagement and economic opportunity are mutually reinforcing but not automatic—programs must deliberately design for both outcomes. Youth employment programs in MENA should integrate civic components, and civic programs should address the economic preconditions for sustained participation. A young person working 14-hour days in the informal economy cannot attend a municipal council meeting—economic inclusion is a precondition for civic inclusion.

The question confronting policymakers is not whether MENA youth want to participate—the evidence on digital activism, protest movements, and the demand for emigration all point to a generation seeking agency. The question is whether institutions will adapt quickly enough to channel that energy constructively before disillusionment becomes permanent.

References

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