Executive Summary
Unofficial diplomacy—encompassing Track 1.5 and Track 2 processes—has played a critical but underappreciated role in shaping conflict resolution and confidence-building across the Middle East. From the back-channel negotiations that produced the 1993 Oslo Accords to Pugwash-facilitated dialogues on Iran's nuclear program and contemporary Track 2 efforts surrounding the Abraham Accords framework, informal diplomatic channels have repeatedly demonstrated their capacity to generate ideas and build relationships that official diplomacy cannot. Yet these processes face persistent challenges: measuring effectiveness, sustaining funding, ensuring participant safety in authoritarian contexts, and transferring outcomes from the informal to the formal track. This paper examines the evolution of unofficial diplomacy in the region, evaluates key case studies, assesses effectiveness and limitations, and offers policy recommendations for strengthening the bridge between unofficial dialogue and official policy action.
I. Defining the Tracks: Origins and Conceptual Framework
In 1981, American diplomat Joseph V. Montville and psychiatrist William Davidson introduced the term "Track Two diplomacy" to describe "unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help to resolve their conflict." The distinction was straightforward: Track 1 referred to official, government-to-government diplomacy conducted by professional diplomats; Track 2 referred to everything that happened outside those formal channels.
The framework was later expanded. In 1996, Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald published Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace, identifying nine distinct tracks of diplomatic engagement ranging from government action (Track 1) through professional conflict resolution, business, private citizen exchange, research, activism, religion, funding, and media. Within this expanded taxonomy, Track 1.5 emerged as a hybrid category: dialogues that include government officials participating in an unofficial capacity alongside non-governmental experts and scholars. Neither fully official nor purely academic, Track 1.5 processes operate in the space where policy thinking meets political possibility.
What distinguishes these tracks from one another is not merely the identity of participants but the rules of engagement. Track 2 dialogues typically operate under the Chatham House Rule or comparable confidentiality agreements. Participants speak in their personal capacity, not as representatives of their governments. This freedom from institutional constraint is precisely what gives unofficial diplomacy its analytical value: ideas can be raised, scenarios tested, and concessions explored without the political cost that attaches to official positions. As Dalia Dassa Kaye of RAND observed, "What seems unthinkable today may, through unofficial contacts, become the norm tomorrow."
The Middle East as a Laboratory
The Middle East has been one of the most active theaters for unofficial diplomacy. During the 1990s alone, approximately 100 Track 2 events were organized in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict—averaging roughly one per month. The region's characteristics make it simultaneously fertile and inhospitable ground for unofficial channels: the density of intractable conflicts generates demand for creative problem-solving, while the authoritarian governance structures in many states constrain civil society participation and raise the personal stakes for participants.
II. Case Studies: When Unofficial Channels Moved the Needle
The Oslo Back Channel (1993)
The most celebrated example of Track 2 diplomacy transitioning to Track 1 outcomes in the Middle East remains the Oslo process. In late January 1993, secret talks began in Norway, facilitated by the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science (FAFO) and social scientist Terje Rød-Larsen, with the active encouragement of Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin. The initial participants were two Israeli academics—Dr. Yair Hirschfeld and Dr. Ron Pundak—and PLO treasurer Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala). Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst served as host and gentle mediator.
Fourteen sessions of talks were held over eight months behind, as historians have noted, "a thick veil of secrecy." The process began as a pure Track 2 exercise—academics and unofficial representatives exploring possibilities—but evolved into an official negotiation as representatives with formal mandates joined the group. The result was the Declaration of Principles, formalized with the iconic handshake between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn in September 1993.
Hirschfeld himself identified four factors that contributed to the channel's success: the preservation of absolute secrecy, the excellent working conditions provided by the Norwegian hosts, the personal chemistry between participants, and the gradual escalation from informal exploration to formal negotiation. The Oslo case became a template—and, as subsequent history showed, a cautionary tale about the gap between agreements reached through unofficial channels and the political will required to implement them.
Scholars at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs later documented six case studies of Track 2 talks from the 1990s—including Oslo, Palestinian-Israeli talks under the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Israeli-Syrian meetings of 1992–1994, the 1994–1995 Stockholm talks, discussions between Israeli settlers and the Palestinian Authority, and arms control dialogues. Despite their different perspectives, the study's two Israeli and two Palestinian authors reached shared conclusions about both the utility and the limitations of these processes.
Pugwash Conferences and Middle East Security
The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, recipients of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize, represent a different model of Track 2 engagement—one organized around scientific expertise rather than political proximity. Founded in 1957 to address nuclear risks, Pugwash expanded its mandate to facilitate dialogue on security challenges in the Middle East, with particular focus on the Iranian nuclear program.
Through its tradition of "dialogue across divides," Pugwash has organized meetings in The Hague and Vienna that brought together currently serving Iranian officials and former American officials—a Track 1.5 configuration made necessary by the absence of formal U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations since 1980. These dialogues helped build the intellectual foundations for what became the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations, socializing participants on both sides to the parameters of a possible agreement long before official negotiations began.
Pugwash's model demonstrates a key principle: scientific and technical expertise can serve as a neutral framework for discussion when political frameworks are too charged. By framing nuclear issues in terms of physics, verification regimes, and technical safeguards rather than political ultimatums, Pugwash dialogues created space for pragmatic exploration that purely political Track 2 efforts could not achieve.
Jordan as a Hub for Regional Dialogue
Jordan has emerged as a critical geographic and institutional hub for Track 2 diplomacy in the broader Middle East. Amman's relative political stability, its geographic centrality, and the Hashemite Kingdom's historical role as a mediator have made it a preferred venue for unofficial dialogues on conflicts across the region.
Recent examples illustrate this role. In 2024 and 2025, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen conducted a series of political dialogues with Yemeni actors in Amman, engaging representatives from multiple political parties and civil society organizations. Jordan has also hosted civil society-led peace conferences, including the Yemen International Forum, where Yemeni actors and international stakeholders discussed political solutions, humanitarian concerns, and multi-stakeholder participation in the peace process. These dialogues operate at the intersection of Track 1.5 and Track 2, blending official UN facilitation with civil society participation in a format that neither pure Track 1 nor pure Track 2 could sustain independently.
Saudi-Israeli Engagement and the Abraham Accords
The normalization agreements known as the Abraham Accords (2020) were preceded by years of quiet, unofficial engagement between Israeli and Gulf Arab interlocutors. Saudi Arabia's approach has been characterized as "creeping normalization"—a gradual, largely informal rapprochement that included granting Israeli flights permission to use Saudi airspace, quiet security cooperation, and positive public statements by senior Saudi officials.
These unofficial contacts operated in a Track 1.5 space: participants were closely connected to their respective governments but engaged without formal diplomatic mandates. As Brookings Institution analysis has noted, the significance of Saudi-Israeli Track 2 diplomacy lies not in any single breakthrough but in the cumulative effect of sustained engagement on elite attitudes and policy frameworks. However, the October 2023 war in Gaza dramatically disrupted this trajectory. A comprehensive August 2025 survey found that 99 percent of Saudi respondents viewed establishing normal relations with Israel negatively—a stark illustration of how Track 2 progress among elites can be overtaken by shifts in public opinion driven by events on the ground.
III. Measuring Effectiveness: The Evaluation Challenge
One of the most persistent challenges in unofficial diplomacy is measuring its impact. As USIP's evidence review of Track 2 dialogues concluded, there is "continuous confusion and lack of conceptual clarity around the term dialogue, as very different types of communications and meeting formats are labeled as 'dialogue.'" This conceptual ambiguity complicates systematic evaluation.
RAND's landmark study, Talking to the Enemy (2007), by Dalia Dassa Kaye, identified several structural barriers to evaluation. Track 2 exchanges "generally have taken a long-term approach geared toward socializing elites with access to and influence on policy makers, with the goal of shaping the policy debate." Because impact is diffuse and temporally distant from the dialogue itself, causal attribution is inherently difficult. A Track 2 dialogue may plant an idea that surfaces in official policy years later—but proving that connection is nearly impossible.
The RAND study also identified a troubling counter-finding: some Track 2 discussions "led to parties developing even more negative attitudes about the other side." This suggests that the direction of influence is not guaranteed and that poorly designed dialogues can be counterproductive. Track 2 discussions can also "raise false hopes if group members are not in tune with the political realities of their governments and societies."
Toward Better Metrics
Recent scholarship from the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (2024) has proposed several frameworks for strengthening evaluation. These include: tracking the subsequent policy positions of participants; documenting the uptake of specific proposals generated in Track 2 settings into official negotiating frameworks; assessing changes in media framing that correlate with Track 2 output; and conducting longitudinal studies of participant networks and their influence on policy communities.
The Council's research also emphasizes the importance of native-language mediators who understand the cultural codes of participants—a factor that Western-organized Track 2 efforts have historically underweighted. Academic institutions are recommended as more neutral sites for dialogue, reducing the perception of strategic manipulation that can accompany government-adjacent facilitation.
IV. Structural Challenges and Limitations
The Transfer Problem
The central challenge of unofficial diplomacy is what scholars call the "transfer problem": how do insights, relationships, and proposals generated in Track 2 settings move into Track 1 policy? The Oslo process remains the exceptional case precisely because it achieved this transfer; most Track 2 efforts do not. Participants may develop personal understandings and creative proposals, but without institutional mechanisms to channel these into official processes, they remain academic exercises.
Participant Risk and Authoritarian Constraints
In the Middle East's authoritarian contexts, Track 2 participation carries real personal risk. Participants from countries without robust civil society protections may face government reprisal for engaging with adversaries. This constrains the pool of participants and can limit the candor that makes Track 2 dialogue valuable. The tense regional environment since October 2023 has further increased the stakes for participants and made it increasingly challenging for Arab-Israeli-oriented Track 2 groups to meet in the region.
Funding and Sustainability
Track 2 programs require sustained funding over years or decades to build the relationships and trust that produce results. Yet funding cycles—whether from governments, foundations, or academic institutions—tend to be short-term and results-oriented. The difficulty of demonstrating measurable outcomes compounds this problem: funders want evidence of impact, but the nature of Track 2 work makes such evidence elusive. As RAND concluded, these efforts are "best used as a long-term strategy without expectations for dramatic policy shifts."
Representation and Legitimacy
A recurring critique of Track 2 diplomacy is that it privileges elite interlocutors—former officials, academics, think tank fellows—who may not represent the populations most affected by conflict. This creates a legitimacy gap: proposals developed by elites in comfortable settings may lack buy-in from communities on the ground. The Saudi normalization example illustrates this vividly: elite-level comfort with Israeli engagement was dramatically out of step with public opinion, a gap that the events of 2023 made impossible to ignore.
V. The U.S. Role: Enabler, Convener, and Complicating Factor
The United States has been the most significant state actor in supporting Track 2 diplomacy in the Middle East, primarily through the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and its Middle East North Africa Center. USIP's mandate to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict has included direct support for Track 2 dialogues, research on best practices, and policy analysis provided to the U.S. government.
U.S.-Iran Track 2 initiatives occupy a unique position because they have occurred in the complete absence of official diplomatic relations since 1980. Organizations including UCLA's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation have organized regional dialogues meeting three times annually in Europe, with as many as 250 participants from multiple countries. These multilateral formats have provided Iranians and Americans with opportunities for sustained engagement on security, nuclear, and regional issues that no official channel could facilitate.
However, the U.S. role is also a complicating factor. American involvement in Track 2 efforts can undermine the perception of neutrality that gives these channels their value. Participants from the region may suspect that U.S.-backed dialogues serve American strategic interests rather than genuinely open-ended exploration. This perception is particularly acute in the current environment, where U.S. credibility as an honest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been questioned by many regional actors. RAND's research specifically recommends that "the appearance of American involvement requires careful consideration"—a diplomatic understatement that reflects a real operational challenge.
Policy Recommendations
Based on the evidence reviewed, the Next Future Institute offers the following recommendations for policymakers, funders, and practitioners:
1. Institutionalize the transfer mechanism. The gap between Track 2 output and Track 1 uptake remains the single greatest weakness of unofficial diplomacy. Governments should establish dedicated liaison functions—within foreign ministries and national security staffs—charged with systematically reviewing Track 2 proposals and assessing their policy relevance. The goal is not to formalize the informal but to ensure that good ideas do not die in conference reports.
2. Invest in long-term funding structures. Track 2 diplomacy produces results over years and decades, not quarters. Funders—governmental, philanthropic, and academic—should develop 10-year funding commitments for sustained dialogue programs, with evaluation frameworks calibrated to long-term relationship building rather than short-term deliverables.
3. Diversify facilitation beyond Western institutions. The Middle East Council on Global Affairs' call for native-language mediators and regionally embedded academic institutions as dialogue hosts should be heeded. Organizations such as the Doha-based Middle East Council, Amman-based research centers, and Gulf academic institutions should be empowered as primary conveners, with Western institutions in supporting rather than leading roles.
4. Broaden participant representation. Track 2 processes must move beyond the familiar circuit of former officials and senior academics. Younger professionals, civil society leaders, women, and community-level actors should be systematically included—not as tokens but as substantive participants whose perspectives are essential to proposals with real-world legitimacy.
5. Develop shared evaluation standards. The field needs agreed-upon metrics for assessing Track 2 effectiveness. Scholar-practitioner collaborations should develop standardized evaluation frameworks that account for the long time horizons and diffuse influence pathways characteristic of unofficial diplomacy, while being rigorous enough to guide funding decisions and program design.
6. Protect participant safety. Governments and international organizations should develop explicit frameworks for protecting Track 2 participants from reprisal, including confidential participation agreements, visa facilitation for meetings in neutral venues, and diplomatic pressure against governments that penalize their citizens for engaging in unofficial dialogue.
7. Maintain channels during crises. The most valuable function of Track 2 diplomacy may be maintaining communication when official channels have collapsed. Donors and conveners should resist the temptation to suspend programs during periods of active conflict or political crisis—precisely the moments when unofficial channels are most needed.
References
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- Diamond, Louise and John McDonald. Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1996.
- Kaye, Dalia Dassa. Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia. RAND Corporation, 2007. rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG592
- Agha, Hussein, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff. Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East. Belfer Center Studies in International Security. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. belfercenter.org
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